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~f ITH PR IMIT IVE  DESCRIPT IONS 
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Abst rac t - - ln  this paper, the problem of instance recognition within an extended hybrid knowledge 
representation system is addressed. Structural aspects of concepts are represented at two separate 
levels, the terminological (using strict definitions) and the prototypical; individuals are expressed in a 
frame-based assertional component. Primitive descriptions in the terminological language are defined 
and discussed. The hybrid reasoning mechanism recognizes the type of the individuals with respect 
to the terminology, making use of reasoning with prototypes associated to primitive concepts. This 
approach shares basic ideas with the "Dual Theory" about the mental representation of concepts; 
concepts have a twofold representation: a "core description," useful for compositional meaning, and 
a further "identification procedure," containing information for recognition of typical instances of 
a concept. Within the identification procedure a "similarity model" is proposed that describes the 
probability rating that an object belongs to a class, supported by the similarity that the object shares 
with the prototype of that class. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATIONS 
This paper addresses the relation among individuals, concepts, primitive descriptions and pro- 
totypes within an hybrid approach d la KL-ONE [1-4]. Tile typical problem we want to solve is 
the recognition of an instance member of a "natural kind" class: is ¢veety  a b i rd?  A b i rd  is 
strictly defined using only the necessary properties that every instance of b l rd  must have, while 
sufficient conditions are missing (i.e., it is a primitive concept, err. Brachman and Schmolze [1]). 
Therefore we can never conclude undeniably that ¢veeey  is a b i rd .  Unless an explicitly stated 
membership in the class b i rd  is present in the information describing ~eety ,  this fact cannot 
be derived from the terminological knowledge. Sumcient conditions must instead be represented 
in the prototypical part of knowledge regarding b i rds .  The reasoning part of the prototypical 
component derives the type for ~eeey  with a similarity mechanism, comparing the description 
of the instance with the prototype. If that similarity match succeeds (i.e., it reaches a given 
threshold), it is possible to assume that ¢veety  is a b i rd ,  since it is similar to a typical b i rd ,  
even if we cannot be one hundred percent confident. 
Brachman in [5,6] provided the basis for a clear distinction in a conceptual hierarchy between 
the "concept as definition" interpretation and the "concept as prototype" interpretation. Two 
important research works which have addressed that problem within a semantic network frame- 
work are Padgham's [7,8] and Shastri's [9] (but see also [10,11]). In Padgham's ystem concepts 
are described as having a "type core," for necessary information, and a "type default," for typical 
information. An extension operation allows one to make a nonmonotonic jump from the core 
to the default of the same concept, insofar as default information does not conflict with already 
known information. The system is able to derive inheritance paths with defaults, over which a 
consistency relation is defined. While core and defaults are qualitatively separated, the lack of 
a weighted representation for default properties does not allow any decision in multiple choice 
situations. Shastri, on the other hand, suggests an evidential reasoning formalism based on a 
semantic network. Nodes represent prototypes or properties, and links are weighted by means 
of values derived from the object frequency in the knowledge domain. The model provides an 
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evidential formalization of inheritance and recognition. However, the lack of a qualitative account 
does not allow any distinctions between membership and typicality judgements. 
In contrast with both Padgham's and Shastri's works our own work is based upon two coex- 
isting basic properties that characterize the concept/prototype relation: (i) given the fact that 
they represent qualitatively different information, we have two qualitatively different inference 
mechanisms cooperating in an hybrid system; (ii) assuming the prototype theory is well founded, 
it is necessary that prototype recognition gives rise to graduated results: this fact imposes a 
weighted representation for prototypes. 
Within the hybrid representation paradigm [12-15], different subsystems with a unified seman- 
tics provide a convenient way to express--and to reason about--the different kinds of knowledge 
involved (e.g., terminological in the TBox and assertional in the ABox). Pursuing the ideas pre- 
sented in [16,17], we propose a further division, such that structural (as opposed to assertional) 
aspects of concepts are represented at two separate levels, the terminological (strict definitional) 
and the prototypical; individuals (a.k.a. instances) and sets are expressed in a frame-based aaser- 
tional ABox component. This hybrid reasoning mechanism recognizes the type of the individuals 
on the basis of the terminological and prototypical knowledge. 
In any realistic knowledge base, incomplete definitions are an important phenomenon that must 
be treated. We attack the problem of the general relation between terminology and prototypes 
through the case of primitive descriptions, both for its relevance and because consequences of 
this extended hybridity are well circumscribed. 
Basic ideas are shared with the so called Dual Theory [18,19] about the mental representation 
of concepts. Within this theory concepts have a twofold representation: a "core description," 
useful for compositional meaning, and an "identification procedure" for typical instance recog- 
nition. Our own realization of such a distinction is that the core strictly defines the necessary 
and sufficient properties for the concepts (only the necessary ones in the case of primitive con- 
cepts), while the identification procedure is a similarity mechanism that works over a collection 
of perceptual and functional propcrtics. We call such a collection the prololype for that concept. 
Some concepts (in particular primitive concepts such as natural kinds like bird) are customarily 
referred to through the prototype features (a b i rd  typically flies and has wings), and whose core 
description depends on necessary properties (a b i rd  is, among other things, an an imal  which 
_ , 'eproduces - t :h rough an egg. On the other hand there are concepts that have a core de- 
scription defining them completely and whose prototype xpresses unnecessary but useful typical 
information in the definition. For example, a horseman is precisely a person  who r ides  a 
horse  and has a prototype represented by a set of typical features (e.g., wears  spurs ,  and 
has-behav i  our  courageous). 
This work starts with the issue of representations of primitive descriptions in a terminological 
language. We shall introduce a new component in the hybrid reasoning process, based on proto- 
typical knowledge bound to the terminological one through primitive concepts. The central part 
of our work focuses on the relations between the different representation a d reasoning compo- 
nents within the hybrid representation paradigm. We will discuss how this view accommodates 
a cognitively plausible model for the similarity mechanism, based upon the prototypical compo- 
nent. Results and consequences are maintained in the ABox, as shown in the conclusion of the 
paper. 
2. PR IMIT IVE  DESCRIPT IONS IN A HYBRID LANGUAGE 
In this section, we shall introduce primitive descriptions in the framework of a hybrid language, t 
Regarding the terminological component, we shall show how a definition (i.e., the relation between 
a name and a terminological description) is to be interpreted for primitive concepts and roles, and 
how atomic descriptions are related to primitive descriptions. Finally the assertional component 
is introduced. 
*Although the assumptions made in our work are mainly independent from the particular hybrid TBox/ABox 
language, we will refer implicitly to the YAK system [17,18]. Specifically, YAK is quite similar to Classic [2] and 
Loom [3]. YAK has been developed as the imowledge representation system of the ALFresco natural anguage 
system, a multimodal dialogue prototype for the exploration of Italian art history. 
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Figure 1. The ternfinological definitions of the knowledge base referred to through- 
out the article are depicted here, following the graphical paradigm of KI.-ONt~. The 
equivalent linear form representation f this terminology is expressed in Figure 2, 
using the YAK language. Concepts are represented by the bigger ellipses, and the 
links emerging from them fort** their definition. Dashed links denote roles (the small 
circles) and their restrictions, wlfile solid lines denote the definitional "specializes" 
relations. A primitive concept, i.e., a concept with an inco, nplete definition, is de- 
picted with bold ellipses. Roles are represented by the small circles; they can be 
defined as specialization of otller roles (through the solid links), as singh.*valued 
(double circles}, as pri,uitive (bold circles). Grou.d atomic concepts, i.e., concepts 
with no associated efinition, are filled with a grey pattern. 
TBox descriptions (terms, i.e., concepts and roles) are specified in terms of other descriptions. 
A concept can be defined as being precisely the conjunction of other concepts (for example u a 
H ippoqryph is both a horse  and a b i rd ,  among other possible properties), or as having a role 
restricted to another concept (e.g., a horseman is a person  who : ides  a horse) .  
~.1. Incomplete Definitions 
The possibility of expressing primitive concepts in the terminological language is introduced to 
account for the incompleteness of a definition. This is appropriate when the description associated 
with a concept is merely necessary but not sufficient o define the concept [1]. In analogy with 
the Dual Theory we call core description the description associated to a primitive concept; the 
core description expresses the necessary conditions an individual must satisfy to belong to the 
class represented by the primitive concept. 
For example, to define completely the concept person  it is not sufficient to state that a 
person  is an an imal  (this is the core description); that is why we introduce that concept as 
primitive (Figures 1 and 2). With such a primitive concept we do not say what distinguishes a 
person  from an an imal ;  we just say that there is some specialization which makes person  a 
subclass of an imal ,  and we give it a name. As in the case of non-primitive--a.k.a, definite--- 
concepts, in such a definition we have associated to a name (person)  a description (it is a generic 
specialization of an imal ) ,  which expresses exactly the knowledge that defines that term. 
In systems in which the objects of predications are concepts--as in McAllester [20J--the asso- 
ciation between a name and a concept description (its definition) is indeed an equality between 
terms. So in every conceptual expression containing a name we can substitute its definition. This 
~The examples we use throughout the paper refer to the terminological definitions in Figures 1 and 2. In the text 
concepts appear in plain font, roles in italic font, and individuals in bold font. 
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is a nice property, because it simplifies the algorithms and the formal study of the language. In 
the case of primitive concepts the association between a concept name and its description is a set 
inclusion between terms. In fact, from an extensional point of view, the set of all individuals sat- 
isfying the core description associated to a primitive concept is a generic subset of the extension 
of the same description associated to a definite concept. So it is no longer possible to substitute 
names with their associated conceptual descriptions, if they are primitive concepts. Substitutiv- 
ity is lost essentially because the name is part of the definition of a primitive concept. Informally 
speaking, we can say that the name of a primitive concept fulfils the part of knowledge which is 
not specified in the (partial) definition; in other words, the name is part of the semantics of a 
primitive concept. Formal semantics of primitive concepts is addressed, for example, in [21,22]. 
> DEFCONCEPT PERSON (PRIMITIVE ANIMAL)) 
PR IMIT IVE  ANIMAL {P}I) 
> DEFCONCEPT HORSEMAN (AND PERSON (EVERY RIDES HORSE))) 
AND PERSON 
> (DEFCONCEPT 
AND PERSON 
> (DEFCONCEPT 
AND PERSON 
> DEFCONCEPT 
AND PERSON 
> DEFCONCEPT 
AND PERSON 
> DEFCONCEPT 
; Concept definitions 
(EVERY RIDES HORSE)) 
RIDER (AND PERSON (EVERY RIDES SOME-VEIITCI,E))) 
(EVERY RIDES SOME-VEIIICLE)) 
ROUND-TABLE-KNIGHT (AND PERSON (EVERY RIDES HIPPOGRYPH))) 
(EVERY RIDES HIPPOGRYPH)) 
CYCLIST (AND PERSON (EVERY PEDALS BICYCLE))) 
(EVERY PEDALS BICYCLE))  
LONE-KNIGHT (AND PERSON (EVERY RIDES-ONLY-ONE HIPPOGRYPH))) 
(EVERY RIDES-ONLY-ONE HIPPOGRYPH)) 
FAST-LONE-KNIGHT (AND ROUND-TABLE-KNIGHT 
(EVERY GALLOPS-ONLY-ONE II~PPOCRYPII))) 
(AND ROUND-TABLE-KNIGHT (EVERY GALLOPS-ONLY-ONE HIPPOGRYPH))  
> DEFCONCEPT SOME-VEHICLE (PRIMITIVE VEHICLE)) 
(PRIMIT IVE VEHICLE  {P}2) 
> DEFCONCEPT BICYCLE (PRIMITIVE (AND SOME-VEHICLE OBJECT))) 
(PRIMITIVE (AND SOME-VEHICLE  OBJECT) {P}3) 
> DEFCONCEPT HORSE (PRIMITIVE (AND ANIMAL VE[IICLE))) 
(PRIMITIVE (AND ANIMAL VEHICLE) {P)4) 
> (DEFCONCEPT HIPPOGRYPH (PRIMITIVE (AND HORSE BIRD))) 
PR IMIT IVE  (AND HORSE BIRD) (P)5) 
> DEFCONCEPT FISH (PRIMITIVE (AND ANIMAL (EVERY REPRODUCES-THROUGH EGG)))) 
PR IMIT IVE  (AND ANIMAL (EVERY REPRODUCES-THROUGH EGG)) {P}6) 
> DEFCONCEPT BIRD (PRIMITIVE (AND ANIMAL (EVERY REPRODUCES-THROUGH EGG)))) 
PR IMIT IVE  (AND ANIMAL (EVERY REPRODUCES-THROUGH EGG)) {P}7) 
> (DEFCONCEPT MIGRATORY-BIRD (AND BIRD MIGRANT)) 
AND BIRD MIGRANT) 
> (DEFCONCEPT SWALLOW (PRIMITIVE (AND BIRD MIGRANT))) 
PR IMIT IVE  (AND BIRD MIGRANT) (P}8) 
> DEFCONCEPT STORK (PRIMITIVE (AND BIRD MIGRANT))) 
PR IMIT IVE  (AND BIRD MIGRANT) {P}9) 
DEFRELATION PEDALS (PRIMITIVE RIDES)) ; Role definitions 
(PRIMIT IVE RIDES (P}I0) 
> DEFRELATION RIDES-ONLY-ONE (SINGLE-VALUED RIDES)) 
(S INGLE-VALUED RIDES) 
> DEFRELATION GALLOPS-ONLY-ONE (PRIMITIVE RIDES-ONLY-ONE)) 
(PR IMIT IVE  R IDES-ONLY-ONE (P)II) 
> CLASSIFY-ALL) ; Classify the whole KB 
OK 
> (GRAPIi-CONCEPTS) ; Draw induced taxonomy (Figure 3) 
OK 
Figure 2. An ~tmd snap of the inter~tion with the YAK ~stem, w~le introducing 
the same terminology expre~ed in Figure 1. Comparing throe definitions with the 
correspon~ng defimtlons expreued m ~ap~cal  ~rm (~gure 1), the reader can un- 
de~tand the meaning of such a linear syntax. The armwe~ from the ~stem appear 
bold font, and denote the intem~ ~presentat|o~ of the concept defmit~ns. F~ally 
the whole knowledge base is clauifled, i.e., all the valid su~umptions between any 
two concepts of the terminology (reflected in Figure 3) are computed. 
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It is still possible to have substitutivity between ames and primitive descriptions, if the rep- 
resentation language is augmented with the possibility of marking primitive descriptions with an 
index, which relates a specific name with a unique description. For example (see Figure 2), if 
f i sh  is a primitive concept defined through the necessary condition of being an an imal  which 
reproduces - through an egg, by marking it with the index {P}6 it is possible to distinguish 
it from a b i rd ,  which is defined through the same necessary condition but is marked {P}7. In 
this way unnecessary names are avoided, if they are used only to identify primitives, resulting 
in an economy for the taxonomy, a However, this method of indexing primitives lacks intuitivity 
within a graphic paradigm, in which the difference between primitives with an equal description 
is stated simply by drawing them as (spatially) different concepts (as for example f i sh  and 
bird). 
In analogy with concepts, roles also can be specified in terms of other roles, and can be in a 
taxonomic hierarchy. For example the relation peda is  is defined as a primitive specialization 
of the relation r ides .  
2.2. Atomic Terms 
An atomic concept (or role) is the simplest kind of concept (or role), the only information 
associated to it being its name. An atomic concept is equivalent to a primitive concept having 
the same name and a core description stating that it is a specialization of anyth ing- - i .e . ,  the 
most general term representing the whole domain, at the top of the taxonomy. In fact nothing 
else can be stated about an atomic concept, except hat its extension represents a non-specified 
subset of the domain. 
We make the unique name assumption, thus it is never the case that the model-theoretic 
interpretations of two atomic concepts with different names are equal in every valid model of the 
knowledge base (the theory). For example, an an imal  is "different" from a veh ic le ,  even if both 
these concepts have no information attached to them and appear to have the same syntactical 
definition except for their names. This means that there may be some valid interpretations of
the theory in which animals and vehicles are equivalent, or interpretations in which they are in a 
hierarchical relation, or interpretations in which they are disjoint, or possibly interpretations in 
which there is simply an intersection. If we explicitly put a disjointedness constraint between two 
atomic concepts--as for (inanimate) ob jec t  and an imal - -we  restrict the number of possible 
interpretations, such that it is possible to conclude not only that they are not in hierarchical 
relation, but also that they are disjoint. 
2.3. Classification with Primitive Descriptions 
The terminology, i.e., the set of all the names related to some definition, includes both primitive 
and definite concepts. The reasoning mechanism--the classifier--deduces all the valid subsump- 
tions between a terminological description and the terminology, i.e., it derives the set of most 
specialized concepts in the terminology subsuming the description to be classified. The classifier 
is based on the subsumption procedure, which is able to conclude whether a relation of sub- 
sumption holds between two concepts--either definite or primitive. The taxonomic hierarchy is 
induced from a terminology by classifying every named term (Figure 3): thus there is a unique 
taxonomy involving both definite and primitive concepts. 
It is now shown through some examples how classification is performed in a language allowing 
primitive descriptions. As usual we refer to the terminology defined in Figures 1 and 2; the 
complete taxonomy induced by the classifier is shown in Figure 3. 
Looking at the case of definite concepts, the classifier deduces that a Round-Table-knight 
specializes a horseman because he r ides  a H ippogryph.  
Primitive concepts are assumed to be "different" unless they are labelled with the same name, 
even if they have the same core description associated: a b i rd  is different from a f i sh  even if 
both are defined as generic specializations of animal reproducing through eggs. 
~Names are not only a syntactic sugar to label complex descriptions, but they are the elements on which the 
classification service (see below) is based. 
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ANYTHING 
;RANT OBJECT VEHICLE ANIMAL 
\ / 
MIGRATORY-BIRD BICYCLE HIPPOGRYPH / \  
STOKK SWALLOW 
FISH PERSON 
RIDER HORSEMAN CYCLIST 
ROUND-TABLE-KNIGHT 
1 
LONE-KNIGHT 
I 
FAST-LONE-KNIGHT 
Figure 3. The taxonomy induced by the definitions of the knowledge base shown in 
Figures ! and 2. The links represent all the valid subsumption relations betwee~a any 
two concepts, in an optimal way (considering that subsmnption is a reflexive and 
tra~sitive relation). 
The classifier will not conclude that a primitive concept subsumes another (definite or primitive) 
concept, unless the latter mentions this fact explicitly in its definition (i.e., refers to the name 
or" the primitive concept). A horse  is classified under an ima l  because this is stated in its 
definition: a horse  is by definition, among other things, an an imal  and a veh ic le .  In tile 
same way the classifier deduces that a horseman is a person .  
However, the classifier cannot deduce that, given the concept some-veh ic le  defined as a 
generic specialization of veh ic le ,  a horseman specializes a r ider ,  defined as a person  who 
: ides  some-veh ic le .  This is false even if a horse  is a veh ic le ,  because a valid interpre- 
tation for r ider  could be for example a cyc l i s t  (bicycle rider). 
It is also not true that a cyc l i s t  is a r ider ,  even if intuition suggests that a person  who 
peda2s a b icyc le  should be also a person  who r ides  some-veh ic le ,  given the fact that 
the relation peda2z is a specialization of the relation r ides.  This fact derives essentially from 
the universal condition imposed on the fillers of a relation defining a concept: every cyc l i s t  
pedals  necessarily a b icyc le ,  if he r ides  some-veh ic le .  By restricting the domain and 
the range of a relation (like the relation pedals  with respect o the relation : ides),  it is possible 
that in some interpretation f the theory the extension of the universally defined concept increases 
(there is some cyc l i s t  who is not a r ider ) .  However in the case of functional roles [23]-- 
i.e., relations constrained to have only one filler--this possibility is ruled out and the intuitively 
expected eduction is satisfied: this is the case of a fas t - lone-kn ight  who is deduced to be 
a specialization of a lone-kn ight .  
It is also worth noting that, from the disjointedness constraint between an imal  and (inani- 
mate) ob jec t ,  a cyc l i s t  can never be a horseman in any interpretation of our theory. 
Although the classifier seems to be limited by the incompleteness of knowledge in the specifi- 
cation of a primitive concept [24,25], it can still draw all the correct deductions. The classifier 
provided within the YAK system has a sound and complete algorithm: it deduces all (and only) 
the true subsumption relations [21]. The algorithm works in polynomial time if there are no names 
in the terminology--yet Nebel [26] has proved that any terminological language with naming is 
inherently intractable. We argue that, thanks to a caching mechanism and to an intelligent name 
expansion scheduling, the general algorithm is still tractable in the average case. 
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~.~. The ABoz and the Recognizer 
Individuals in the assertional component (ABox) are related with the terms representing their 
type. A type represents the set of all the most specific concepts, from the given terminology, 
which describes the individual; it is obtained by classifying in the terminology the complete 
"abstraction" of the individual, i.e., a concept describing only that individual. Types for indi- 
viduals are maintained by a procedure called recogni:er [15,27,28], which is the basic reasoning 
mechanism of the ABox. 
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Figure 4. Assertion of an individual in the ABox: the system is informed of the 
existence of an individual c~lled Tweety, which (referring to the terms defined in the 
TBox) is an Animal and a Migrant, and has the properties of reproducing tlurou#~ 
some Egg, moving using with A kind of Wing and flying. The system will deduce, 
from the terminological knowledge, that the type of Tweety is nothing other than the 
union of the concepts Animal and Migraalt; the system will not deduce that Tweety 
is a bird without using prototypical knowledge. 
For example, looking at Figure 4, the individual ~reety  is asserted as migrant and animal 
which has the properties of reproducing through some egg, moving using with a kind of wing 
and flying. The abstraction of this individual is a concept which is classified under the concepts 
migrant: and animal.  In other words the recognizer identifies the individual with respect o 
the known terms. Since the recognizer is based on the terminological c assifier, nothing can be 
said to be a specialization of a primitive concept (like b£rd) without referring to it directly (for 
the reasons explained above). That is why the recognizer is not able to conclude nor to refute 
definitely that the type for Tweety is migratory -b i rd ,  even if we would say that it has the 
typical properties of a migratory bird. 
Another mechanism is necessary to refine the type of an individual with respect o definito- 
rial knowledge: a reasoning mechanism based on prototypical knowledge. A prototype captures 
sumcient conditions to recognize an individual, whereas in the terminological language a defi- 
nite concept captures both the necessary and sufficient conditions and a primitive concept only 
tile necessary conditions. In the following we consider prototypes as expressing the knowledge 
that allows an individual to be recognized as an instance of a prialitive concept. Prototypical 
knowledge is linked to appropriate names in the terminology through primitive concepts. 
3. PROTOTYPES 
The prototype theory, as developed by Rosch [29,30], suggests some plausible hypotheses for 
an explanation of typicality effects. One of the basic assumptions is that members of the same 
category are not equivalent, but they show a degree of representativeness (e.g., a robin is a better 
exemplar of bird than a penguin) though the ordering may not be total. The typicality value plays 
a part in much cognitive behaviour, such as differences in speed of processing, free production 
of exemplars, natural language use of category terms, asymmetries in similarity relationships 
between category exemplars, learning etc. 
Among approaches to prototype representation compatible with Rosch's theory, the feature 
approach, claiming that prototypes are mentally represented as a collection of relevant features 
[19] is the cornerstone of our work. Upon this basis we accomodate a cognitive model resulting 
from the work of Smith and Osherson [31-33]. They suggest a similarity model that describes the 
probability rating that an object belongs to a class supported by the similarity that the object 
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shares with the prototype of that class. The model comprises three components: (a) a prototype 
representation; (b) a procedure for prototype modification; (c) a rule for determining the simi- 
larity between an object and a prototype. We shall introduce in Section 3.1 the representation 
of prototypes in our framework. Point (c) is addressed in Section 3.2. 
The procedure of point (b) is intended to enable prototype combination (e.g., the conjunction 
of two prototypes). We have not yet investigated this problem, nor more generally the problem 
of the relations among prototypes. 
3.1. Prototype Representation 
With respect o our feature-based prototype representation resulting from the Smith and Osh- 
erson model, we shall give an account of prototype formation from individual entities and relations 
within the terminological component. 
Prototypes are represented by means of a labelled collection of attribute/value pairs. Attributes 
can only be roles defined in the terminology, and values are concepts. Each attribute/value pair 
for a given prototype is provided with two weights: the diagnosticity of the attribute and the 
salience of the value. How these two measures are determined depends on the prototype formation 
process. 
Prototype formation. We consider a prototype as an abstraction over a set of individual 
entities, such that it embodies the salient attribute/value pairs. Prototypes refer to primitive 
concepts in the terminology, so tile prototype formation problem is: how to determine sufficient 
conditions for a given primitive concept.'? While at this stage we set aside the problems related 
to learning, in general these call be handled by considering the set of all the instances of tile 
primitive concept and letting an abstraction process work over this set. For the purpose of this 
paper we can consider the abstraction mechanism as a way of determining both tile measures 
of the diagnosticity of an attribute and the salience of a value. So far we have just based this 
mechanism on frequencies 4 over the instance set; diagnosticity and salience are defined in the 
following way: 
• attribute diagnosticity: Given a prototype P derived from a primitive concept 12, we define the 
diagnosticity ofan attribute A associated to P, as the probability that A describes an instance X, 
given the fact that X is a member of C. 
• value salience: given P as the prototype derived from C, we define the salience of the at- 
tribute/value pair A/V as the probability that the A/V pair describes an instance X, given the 
fact that X is a member of C. 
Figure 5 provides agraphical representation forthe prototype referring to the primitive concept 
bird. 
Relations to the terminology. Though attribute/value pairs correspond to roles and con- 
cepts in the terminology, we need a stronger elation between primitive descriptions and proto- 
types in order to guarantee consistency. The basic idea to this end is to consider the prototype 
definition within the terminology and then to test its relations to the associated primitive descrip- 
tion. We shall assume two steps: first a terminological equivalent for a prototype is built, making 
use of the attribute-role and value-concept correspondences; then non-contradiction is verified 
between the terminological equivalent and the primitive description associated to the prototype. 
3.2. Reasoning with Prototypes 
Point (c) of the Smith and Osherson model indicates the necessity of a rule for determining 
the similarity between an object and a prototype. Our prototypieal component adopts a version 
of the contrast model developed by Tversky [34] and Osherson [35]. Instance categorisation i  
this model succeeds when a given threshold on the similarity function is reached. 
The contrast model represents he similarity between an instance I and a prototype P depending 
on three feature sets. The three feature sets are: (1) I fl P, the features common to I and P; (2) 
P- I ,  the prototype distinctive features; (3) I -P,  the instance distinctive features. The additive 
version of the contrast model we adopt is expressed by the equation: 
t Frequencies constitute a clear framework but they do not account for rdevant pragmatic, cultural or social aspects 
that are essential ina Ieaxning model. 
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Figure 5. The prototypical representations of the terms Bird and Fish, compared 
with the corresponding terminological de~-dtions. A primitive definition of a concept 
corresponds to each prototype. In this example a bird has the necessary property of 
reproducing through eggs, but not of flying (because not every bird flies}, whereas 
the property of flying can be considered typical for a bird - 80% of birds fly. To walk 
is less typical for the motion of a bird, but it is still significant. 
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SIM(P, I) = ~ [afi(P n I) - bfi(P - I )  - c f i ( I  - P)]. 
i 
Where i indexes the relevant attributes, fi is assumed to multiply the number of votes (salience) 
for attribute i, and a, b, e are parameters that determine the relative contribution ofeach attribute 
set to the ovcrall similarity. As an example consider tile way a prototypical type for a certain 
instance is inferred. Let Tweety  (Figure 4) have been typed as an imal  and mJ.qrant by 
means of a terminological c assification, and let the "bird" and the "fish" prototypes (Figure 5) 
be considered in order to refine the typing on a prototypical basis. The similarity between the 
instance and the two prototypes i measured by two applications of the contrast model and the 
best result, provided that it reaches a given threshold, is chosen. Assuming the parameters a, b, 
c all equal to 1, we obtain: 
S IM(B IRD,  TWEETY)  = (0.99 - 0.01 - 0.01) + (0.8 - 0.2 - 0.2) = 1.37 
S IM(F ISH,  TWEETY)  = (-0.9 - 0.1) ÷ (-0.8 - 0.2) = -2.  
This assigns a clear preference for the "bird" interpretation o f ' tweety .  
While this formulation is only based on a sum over the features for single feature dependent 
functions, it can well be extended to a more sophisticated one for which one can take account 
of functions that depend on multiple features. In this case relations could be accounted for by 
a view quite consistent with the rationale that led to the introduction of structural descriptions 
involving relations in the terminology. 
The contrast model respects the following properties that influence human similarity judge- 
ments: focus hypothesis (i.e., common features have a greater weight than distinctive features), 
asyn~netry (i.e., the subject has a larger import than the referent of the judgement), context 
dependency (i.e., context dependent features are more relevant). 
3.3. A comment on Probability and Similar ity 
A large cognitive science literature investigates the relation between typicality and similar- 
ity, usually coming to the conclusion that object categorisation is mainly based on similarity 
judgements--but see Rips [36]. On the other hand, computational models give particular atten- 
tion to the decision making problem within limited information contexts (i.e., define a calculus 
that provides a rating for the match between an instance and a prototype). Such a calculus 
is usually based on some kind of frequency combination among the domain objects, and object 
categorisation is defined as the best choice among a set of given candidates. 
However, while probability theory (at least in the standard Bayesian formulation) is a well 
known formalism supporting extensional semantics, it has been shown that human behaviour 
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does not strictly follow the probability rules. Tversky and Kahneman [37] point out that at least 
two pieces of evidence contradict Bayes theorem. In one case they show that people are inclined 
to violate the conjunction rule when asked to estimate the probability that an object belongs to 
a compound category. They give the example of Linda, described as "outspoken and concerned 
with issues of social justice," who is judged more likely to be a feminist bank teller than a bank 
teller. They explain this behaviour by claiming that people's estimates are based on sin/laxity 
rather than true probabilities. Moreover in [37] it is claimed that people, when asked to estimate 
the probability of a hypothesis given some evidence, often ignore the prior probability of the 
hypothesis. The authors produce examples in which people consider only the representativeness 
or similarity of the evidence to the hypothesis. 
Though the similarity hypothesis allows a better explanation for human behaviour, a deep 
comprehension of similarity is still just beginning. Two aspects used to define similarity are: the 
surface-deep differentiation, and the global-dimensional one. Surface similarity is often viewed as 
bound to perceptual aspects, while deep is bound to functional descriptions. A better version of 
this might view surface similarity as that depending on readily accessible components of concepts 
(and therefore often, but not necessarily, limited to perceptual characteristics). On the global- 
dimension aspect, global similarity is seen as a holistic attitude, while dimensional similarity is 
conceived of as. the ability to differentiate and to make actual use of different dimensions (e.g., for 
perceptual properties: part identity, colour, size or relations uch as "greater than"). With regard 
to the surface-deep aspect, our approach permits the core definition to be maintained separately 
from surface aspects, that could, in principle, be characterized also with the level of accessibility. 
Regarding the second point our approach is not global in the specified sense, but synthetic, with 
the possibility of restricted application along with a collection of privileged imensions. 
4. t IYBRID REASONING WITH PROTOTYPES 
We have seen wily tile type of an individual should be derived not only from definitional 
properties, but also from another source of knowledge: the prototype. We will see now how this 
can be accomplished within the hybrid representation paradigm. 
The hybrid recognizing process is guided by the terminological c assifier, which uses the de- 
scription of the individual to be recognized, enriched with hypotheses drawn from consulting, in 
a coherent way, the prototypical knowledge. 
At first the individual is recognized as such, according to the definitions present in the knowl- 
edge base, resulting in the most precise, universally true, type assignment. For example (Figure 6) 
the individual Tweety  is recognized as a migrant  an ima l .  Tweety  is not recognized as a b i rd  
because this fact is not universally true: it is not possible to distinguish it from a f i sh - -we  can- 
not exclude, as far as the terms are defined, the existence in some interpretation of a migrant  
f i sh  who has wings and flies. 
(CLOSE-ASSERT TWEETY ; Assert Tweety 
(INDIVIDUAL (AND ANIMAL MIGRANT) 
(FILLS REPRODUCES-THROUGH (INDIVIDUAL EGG)) 
(FILLS (SINGLE-VALUED MOTION) (INDIVIDUAL FLY)) 
(FILLS (SINGLE-VALUED PROPULSORY-MEDIUM) (INDIVIDUAL WING)))) 
TWEETY 
> (INDIVIDUAL-TYPE TWEETY) 
(ANIMAL MIGRANT)  
> (CLOSE-ASSERT TWEETY (INDIVIDUAL BIRD)) 
TWEETY 
> (INDIVIDUAL-TYPE TWEETY) 
(M IGRATORY-B IRD)  
Fi~Dtre 6. An actual snap o[ the interaction with the YAK system, while asserting 
and recognizing an individual. The asserted individual Tweety is recognized as both 
an Animal and a Mi~'ant, with respect to the terminological knowledge base (see also 
Figure 4). The type of Tweety can be refined consulting the prototypical knowledge--- 
Tweety being similar to a Bird and not very similar to the other known animals. Such 
a new type is asserted again to specialize the knowledge about the individual. In 
this way the system can deduce that Tweety is a Misratory-bird. 
; Recognize Tweety 
; New assertion (from protoc, kb) 
; Recognize Tweety again 
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To discriminate between possible alternative interpretations, the recognizing process verifies 
whether some hypotheses about the individual can be assumed from the non-definitional part of 
knowledge (i.e., the prototypical). The prototypes associated to primitive concepts pecializing 
the already computed type are taken into consideration, in order to check their similarity with 
the individual to be recognized. 
Before activating the similarity matching, the compatibility between the individual description 
and the core description of the primitive concept associated to the prototype is verified. An 
individual is compatible with the core description of a primitive concept if such a description 
subsumes the abstraction of the individual. If there is incompatibility (for example a disjoint- 
edness constraint or a cardinality constraint is violated) the similarity matching immediately 
fails, because the preconditions are not satisfied. This is true, for example, of the (in)famous 
three-legged elephant [6]: if the terminological definition of an elephant states that an elephant 
must have four legs (as minimum and maximum), an individual similar to an elephant and with 
three legs will never be recognized as an elephant, and the prototype for elephant should not 
have any knowledge about the number of legs of a typical elephant (because very elephant has 
four legs, by definition). On the other hand if the term elephant is described as having possibly 
from zero to four legs in the TBox, and having typically four legs in the prototypical component, 
a three-legged animal similar to an elephant can be recognized as elephant without generating a 
contradiction. 
If the individual to be recognized is compatible with the core description, it will be checked 
if the value of tile similarity function, applied on the individual and the prototype, reaches a 
predetermined threshold. If the match succeeds for more than one prototype, the type of the 
individual is the conjunction of tile separate results only if the corresponding terms are not 
disjoint. In the latter case the responses are mutually exclusive a**d the highest value of the 
similarity fu*lction reveals the type to prefer. The success of the similarity matching implies that 
the i,dividual satisfies the (sufficient) conditions imposed by the prototypical description. The 
individual is estimated to be a "good" exemplar of such concepts, and its definition is refined 
by specifying its membership n those classes. At this point the recognition process is activated 
again and a more specific type for the i,ldividual is computed. The general mechanism requires 
that the terminological classifier/similarity reasoning cycle is recursively activated over and over 
agai,i in a process of gradual refinement of the individual type assignment. 
The importance of verifyi,g the compatibility with the core description before applying the 
similarity match guarantees the "soundness" of the reasoning based on prototypes with respect 
to the terminological knowledge. We claim that the similarity mechanism is responsible only for 
the instance's fuzzy membership of the effective xtension of the primitive term, given that the 
instance belongs to the extension defined by the core description, and it is not responsible for 
an all-or-none membership judgement. We contrast his with a conceivably different mechanism 
that requires an instance only to be not in contradiction with the core description (and does not 
require that it is compatible with it). In this case if the subsequent similarity match succeeds, 
the instance would "inherit" the core description from the primitive concept associated with the 
type being asserted for it. We believe that in this latter way the task of similarity reasoning is 
distorted: it is not only the graduated response about membership, but also a sort of "decision" 
about the necessity of the inherited escription. 
Coming back to our example (Figure 6), Tweety is estimated to be a good exemplar of 
b i rd ,  because the property of proceeding with wings makes it more similar to the prototype of 
b i rd  than to the prototype of f i sh  (Figure 5). Moreover Tweety is compatible with the core 
description of bird (Tweety is an animal which reproduces - through an egg). The fact of 
being a b i rd  is added to the definition of Tweety and the type is computed again, resulting in 
migratory -b i rd  (Figure 7). Now this process can be activated once more, to conclude that 
Tweety is a swal low or a s to rk  or neither of the two. 
It is worth noting that the type computed using prototypical knowledge has of course a lesser 
degree of import than the definitory one. A mechanism ofbelief revision should handle those indi- 
viduals with a different priority, when subsequently asserted knowledge generates a contradiction 
in the knowledge base. 
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Figure 7. A sununary of the hybrid recognizing process for the individual Tweety. 
As a result of the first classification step, Tweety is recognized to be Migrant and 
Animal. The individual is therefore compared with the prototypes associated to two 
concepts specializing Animal: Bird and Fish. Since the similarity matching succeeds 
for the prototype of Bird, the individual is augmented with the information of being 
a Bird, and it is recognized again. The final result is that Tweety is recognized to 
be a Migratory-blrd. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of instance recognition within an extended hy- 
brid architecture. We have focused our attention on relationships between primitive concepts 
in the terminological component and prototypes in the prototype component. The hybrid rea- 
soning mechanism we propose extends the recognizing process of individuals in the assertional 
component. It makes use of the terminological knowledge to derive a first type assignment for 
the individual. This attribution is successively improved by comparing the description of the 
individual (via a similarity mechanism) to prototypes tored in the prototypical component. The 
apparatus distinguishes between qualitatively different information and yet can deal with the 
problem of preferences among the results of similarity-based reasoning. 
Within the framework of a complex hybrid architecture supporting multiple reasoning modal- 
ities, several aspects must still be addressed. A first extension to our work involves the term- 
prototype association, in the sense that also well defined concepts hould map to a prototype, 
as stated in the Dual Theory. For example the system should be able to represent prototypical 
knowledge for the concept horseman,  even if it is terminologically defined in a precise way as, in 
our example, a person  who r ides  a horse .  In this case the core description is itself sufficient 
in order to recognize individuals. It is evident that a nontrivial extension of the hybrid reasoner 
is required. 
Another important issue concerns the inference control procedure in the assertional component, 
as far as a single conclusion can arise out of different modalities which have different import. In 
these cases a belief revision mechanism is necessary to manage nonmonotonic effects. 
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